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PROSPECTS FOR AND PROMOTION OF SPONTANEOUS REPATRIATION
In the literature on voluntary repatriation it is often asserted 
that voluntary repatriation is the 'most desirable' durable 
solution-*- closely followed by pessimistic evaluations of its 
prospects.
Sir John Hope Simpson writing in early 1939 about the 
political, religious, and racial refugees of that time noted:
Deliberate repatriation on a large scale is scarcely 
relevant in a discussion of practical instruments of 
solution. In predictable circumstances voluntary return of 
refugees to their home countries will occur on so small a 
scale as to not affect the refugee problem itself. The 
possibility of ultimate repatriation belongs to the realm 
of political prophecy and aspiration, and a programme of 
action cannot be based on speculation.
More recently the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) in its 1985 Durable Solutions report noted that:
In the last analysis, voluntary repatriation remains - 
despite many successes - the most difficult of durable 
solutions to achieve. ... Even in the best of 
circumstances, only a proportion may repatriate, and 
instances such as the return of virtually an entire 
refugee population from Bangladesh to Burma in the late 
1970s or from neighbouring countries to Zimbabwe in the 
early 1980s are more often the exception than the ru 1 e . ^
Simpson in his time, and UNHCR and others4 today reflect 
common misconceptions about voluntary repatriation. Substantial 
voluntary repatriation frequently occurs but is not clearly 
perceived. Part of the reason for this is the millions of 
unrepatriated refugees who are highly visible but who represent a 
minority of all those who have been refugees. Also, one's 
conception of the problem depends on the types of refugee 
movements one is examining. Simpson's pessimissitic assessment
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of repatriation as a solution was basically right when applied to 
the racial and religious refugees of the inter-war period-- 
Turkish Christians, German Jews--but not to other categories of 
refugees at other times. As Coles has noted:
If, however, a broad interpretation is given to embrace 
all forms of displacement, particularly those as a 
consequence of armed conflict, serious internal disturbance 
or famine or drought, this view is reverse of the truth.
In regard to displacement generally, return is, o n '~t h e 
whole, the rule rather than the exception.5
Although voluntary repatriation is more common than is
generally realized it is by no means easy to achieve. The
changing nature of refugee problems brings peaks and valleys in
the prospects for return. For a while, during the 1960s and
early 1970s, many refugees were able to repatriate after the
successful conclusion of struggles for independence and
liberation from colonial rule. In recent years, the rise of
refugee-producing conflicts--nation-building, revolutionary
change, and conflicts with neighbors--involving the newly
independent states has caused 'the massive arrivals of refugees
in low-income countries where often no durable solutions are at
hand.10 In order to return refugees to their newly independent
homelands, particularly without changes in the regime or
conditions that caused flight, will require some new thinking
about voluntary repatriation and ways of promoting it.
In this chapter we will examine the contemporary challenge
of voluntary repatriation along with some aspects of spontaneous
repatriation.
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SPONTANEOUS VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION 
A prominent feature of today's refugee problems is that 
there are not necessarily more refugees; rather there are more 
without solutions or awaiting solutions. Certain unfortunate 
refugee groups for whom no durable solution is ever found become 
a semi-permanent part of refugee problems. There are still 
Palestinian refugees from the forties; Eritrean and Rwand'ese 
refugees from the sixties; Indochinese, Saharawi , Burundian, 
Afghan, and Ogaden Somalis from the seventies. Today, three- - 
quarters of the world's ten million or so refugees date from 
conflicts that are at least five years old.
Half a decade ago, the High Commissioner informed the 
Executive Committee of the presence in the world of some 
ten million refugees in need of international protection. 
The overwhelming majority of the refugee situations which 
had arisen at that time remain because effective durable 
solutions have so far not been found.
In some refugee situations, flows have now lasted for 
over a decade.?
Although many refugee situations may endure on the 
political landscape and etch themselves in our consciousness, we 
should not conclude that progress is not possible. 'The first 
half of the present decade has continued to see similar movements 
of return to Argentina, Chad, Ethiopia, The Lao People's 
Democratic Republic, Uganda, Uruguay, Zaire, Zimbabwe and 
elsewhere, in all of which UNHCR has been intimately involved. 
However, these successes illustrate some of the contemporary 
difficulties with voluntary repatriation. In many cases where 
UNHCR has been intimately involved only a small proportion of the 
refugees returned home--for example, 2,898 Laotian returnees from
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an estimated total of 89,000 refugees as of mid-1986--and in only 
a few cases--Chad from the Central African Republic, Uganda from 
Rwanda and Zaire, and Zimbabwe from neighboring countries--was 
the return relatively complete.^
Most voluntary repatriation today occurs without, and 
despite UNHCR involvement. Each year tens or hundreds of 
thousands of refugees decide to repatriate spontaneously without 
the assistance of international organizations and outside of the 
framework of protection afforded by international agreements and 
protective accords. Spontaneous repatriation frequently occurs 
without a promised amnesty; without a change of regime or other 
decisive event; without a repatriation agreement or program; 
without the permission of the authorities in the country of 
asylum or origin; without international knowledge; without an end 
to the conflict that caused the exodus. It is based on the 
decision of countless individual refugees that they can return 
home, even in the face of lowered but continued risk. It is also 
influenced by the conditions the refugees exist under in their 
refuge. There are many examples of spontaneous voluntary 
repatriation:
some 400,000 Ethiopian refugees may have returned to 
Ethiopia from Somalia and Djibouti from 1984 to 1986. 
Ethiopia in early 1986. ... some 75,000 Ugandan refugees
fled southern Sudan ... to return with surprising ease to 
Uganda and to begin the process of reintegration.
When word came that the Obote government had been 
overthrown in July 1985, the Uganda [Banyarwandan] refugees 
were jubilant,almost 29,000 refugees returned to Uganda 
[from Rwanda].
A recent report on voluntary r epa t r i a t i on * noted that the 
vast majority of all repatriation occurs without aid from
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international organizations. In some cases where spontaneous and 
organized repatriation occur simultaneously, the spontaneous flow 
may be 100 to 200 times greater than the UNHCR assisted return.^ 
This disparity suggests that a combination of current conditions 
and UNHCR operating principles are presenting difficulties in 
giving full assistance to repatriating refugees. Indeed, in some 
circumstances such as the return of Tigrayans from Sudan ~in 1985, 
UNHCR has been more of a hinderance than a help to repatriation.
To illustrate some of the contemporary problems of 
repatriation, it is useful to look at the contrast between an 
ideal voluntary repatriation and some examples of current 
repatriation situations.
In the best of circumstances, voluntary repatriation will 
follow a basic change in the conditions that caused flight, the 
feared regime will be gone, and the refugees will be welcomed 
home. Zimbabwe in 1980 comes close to an ideal organized 
repatriation scenario. As a result of the 1979 Lancaster House 
agreement, the refugees were returning in victory to their 
liberated homeland. UNHCR was requested to undertake the overall 
coordination of the international effort to assist the 
repatriation. The operational arrangements for the refugees in 
Botswana and Zambia were done through the Lutheran World 
Federation and in Mozambique by government authorities. In 
several phases, both before and after Zimbabwe's independence, 
51,000 refugees returned home through the organized program while 
a larger number, approximately 150,000, returned on their own but 
within the framework of the program.
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Over the years, UNHCR has established three pre-conditions 
for its participation in an organized repatriation.
First and foremost, it must be voluntary .... Secondly, 
there must be clear and unequivocal agreement between the 
host country and the country of origin both on the 
modalities of the movement and the conditions of reception; 
thirdly, it is vitally important that returnees be allowed 
to return to their places of origin - ideally to their own 
former homes, their villages, their land.
UNHCR's overriding concern is the physical safety and socio­
economic reintegration of the returnees. UNHCR rightly insists 
on these formal procedures so as to fulfil its protection 
mandate. However, as the following sketches of recent and 
current repatriations illustrate, reality may mean these 
formalities relegate UNHCR to the sidelines.
FIVE REPATRIATIONS
Many contemporary repatriations are far from ideal; they 
are messy and ambiguous, do not fulfil all or any of UNHCR's pre­
conditions, and raise serious questions of coercion and 
protection. The following five refugee situations which were 
critical in mid-1987--Ethiopia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Uganda, and 
El Salvador--indicate that efforts to promote or assist voluntary 
repatriation take place in a context of reluctant, hostile, or 
unsettled hosts; 1ow-intensity protracted conflicts; repatriation 
regions controlled by insurgents or by uncertain legal regimes; 
and pressures on refugees to choose from amongst unsatisfactory 
choices. New thinking about promoting and assisting repatriation 
needs to confront the realities these examples represent.
T i gray
As a result of separate liberation movements in Eritria and
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Tigray provinces, there have been Ethiopian refugees in Sudan 
since the 1960s. In 1984, several hundred thousand additional 
refugees from the war-torn northern provinces poured into Sudan 
due to drought and famine in Ethiopia.
In 1985, after the resumption of rains in their home 
province, some 54,000 Tigrayan refugees left eastern Sudan and 
returned to Tigray Province of Ethiopia at the height of 'the 
drought and famine and during a period of stepped-up military 
activity. The return was aided by the Relief Society of Tigray 
(REST) and 'covered' by the Tigray People's Liberation Front 
(TPLF). Despite widespread fears that many would die enroute, 
either from starvation or bombing, it appears that most arrived 
home in good health and have done well since their return. 
Indeed, in 1986 even larger numbers returned and the spontaneous 
repatriation continues in 1987. The three phases of return are 
likely to total almost 200,000 refugees. UNHCR did not assist 
the 1985 repatriation; in fact, both UNHCR and the United States 
actively opposed the return. 'In Sudan, far from promoting 
repatriation, UNHCR and other agencies have found it impossible 
to dissuade infirm and elderly refugees from setting out on the 
arduous trek back into Ethiopia!'^ Only limited assistance was 
made available, principally by the Government of Sudan. Limited 
international assistance has been given to the later returnees. 
Cambod ia
In 1979, after the Vietnamese invasion overthrew the Khmer 
Rouge regime, approximately 170,000 Khmer refugees found safety 
in camps in Thailand. An additional 250,000 Khmer refugees have
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been confined to camps on the border since 1979. Thailand has 
long insisted that all Khmer refugees in Thailand must be 
resettled to third countries. To demonstrate its resolve 
regarding resettlement, in June 1979, Thailand forcibly 
repatriated 44,000 Khmer refugees with a great loss of life.
This action led to an international commitment to resettle the 
refugees. By early 1987, only 20,000 of the original 17 0~, 00 0 
Khmer refugees remained in Thai camps. Most of these refugees 
had already been rejected by the several resettlement countries.
In March 1987, Thailand threatened to force these 20,000 
Cambodian refugees to move from the Khao-I-Dang camp to the Thai- 
Cambodian border camps. Less than one thousand refugees were 
forced back to the border camps, but the threat remains. These 
border camps are subjected to attacks from Cambodia and are under 
the control of various Khmer guerrilla armies including the Khmer 
Rouge. The relocated refugees, and the 250,000 other Khmer 
refugees who have been confined to the border since 1979, are 
vulnerable to abuses by both the liberation movements and Thai 
'protecting' forces. Although UNHCR continues to have a 
protection role regarding those moved from Khao-I-Dang, it does 
not have a permanent presence in the border camps.
Mozambique
Mozambique's internal peace has been shattered by the 
guerrilla activities of the Mozambican National Resistance 
(RENAM0) which was established in 1977 with the aid of Rhodesia's 
white-minority government and is currently aided by South Africa. 
Approximately four million Mozambicans have been internally
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displaced and, since 1984, 300,000 have fled to South Africa, 
Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi. The Government of 
Mozambique is trying to arrange for the return of 95,000 of its 
citizens 'externally displaced' in Malawi in 1986. [Mozambique 
has 'repeatedly accused Malawi of providing a haven for 
Mozambican insurgents.'^] These refugees have not fled from the 
actions of their government but from a famine caused by civil 
conflict. Mozambique, when approaching UNHCR for assistance:
made it clear that it prefers 'Mozambicans to be displaced 
in Mozambique than in Malawi and therefore be assisted in 
their home country (as returnees) than in Malawi (as 
refugees)'. ... The government's strategy is to facilitate 
the return of refugees [to areas] ... which may not be 
their original homesteads but are safer as regards 
security ... all efforts will be made to guarantee that maximum 
security prevail in these [returnee] areas.^
However, by mid-1987, rather than returning home, the exodus from
Mozambique was continuing and the number of Mozambican refugees
in Malawi had increased to 200,000.
Uganda
The initial flow of Ugandan refugees into Sudan began after 
the fall of Idi Amin in 1979. Through 1982, the number of Amin 
supporters and other refugees in southern Sudan grew to more than 
350,000 as civilians fled from abuses and reprisals by the forces 
of the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). In 1984 and 1985 
approximately 100,000 refugees spontaneously repatriated to 
Uganda. In January 1986, the UNLA forces were defeated by 
Museveni's National Resistance Army and the prospects for further 
refugee repatriation improved.
In 1986 there were approximately 250,000 Ugandan
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refugees in southern Sudan. Although many of the refugees were 
considering a return home because of 'one of the few periods of 
genuine peace and security in Uganda in the last decade,'1  ^
their return was impelled by a widening civil war in their host 
country that led to a breakdown of authority. In April 1986 
there were 'armed attacks on Ugandan refugee settlements on the 
East Bank of the Nile. '1  ^ Q ver 100,000 Ugandan refugees 'fled 
southern Sudan and returned to Uganda. UNHCR and other agencies 
assisted the returnees with transport and reception facilities, 
Another 150,000 Ugandan refugees may be forced to flee southern 
Sudan in 1987. Fortunately, the timing allows them a somewhat 
safe return to their homeland. However, Uganda is still troubled 
by economic difficulties and political turmoil. One mission 
noted that 'The relief programme for returnees has not been a 
success. ... The [UNHCR] office was crippled by lack of transport 
and commun i cati o n .'
El Salvador
Since the early 1980s about 20,000 refugees from the 
Salvadoran civil war have taken refuge in Honduras. Recently, 
some of the refugees have been returning spontaneously and with 
UNHCR assistance.19 The Salvadorans live in closed camps in 
Honduras and are viewed with hostility. There are 'officially- 
sponsored campaigns of villification depicting the Salvadoran 
refugees and the voluntary agencies which help them as threats to 
Honduran national security. ... Violent crimes against the 
refugees have been committed with apparent i m p u n i t y . I n  1985, 
the Salvadoran camp at Colomoncagua was attacked by the Honduran
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army and several refugees were killed, wounded, or seized. Not 
surprisingly, 'a sizeable number of Salvadoran refugees in 
Honduras have now realized that they cannot reasonably hope for 
local integration' and that 'repatriation is their only hope of 
one day returning to a normal way of life.'21
After a December 1986 visit by J. P. Hocke, the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, approximately 4,5U0 
Salvadoran refugees at the Mesa Grande camp indicated their 
willingness to return to their places of origin in El Salvador,
Another element in El Salvador which is of critical 
importance to the refugees in Honduras is the process of 
'repopulation'"which is now going on. ... After a number of 
years and even though the war continues in several parts of 
the country, groups of displaced persons have begun to 
return to their home communities. ... many groups of 
refugees are risking the uncertainty by returning to their 
home communities.
It is in this context - growing weariness of life in the 
camps and increasing awareness of the re-population 
movement in El Salvador that 4,500 refugees in Mesa Grande 
for repatriation.22
As of mid-1987, however, due to reluctance on the part of the 
Armed Forces of El Salvador to permit a mass return to the 
original areas, only individual repatriations were being arranged 
by UNHCR. The frustrated refugees at Mesa Grande 'have 
unilaterally declared that they intend to return to their home 
areas ... with or without the cooperation of the Honduran or 
Salvadoran governments, ' 22 or of UNHCR.
As these sketches indicate, UNHCR's three preconditions for 
participating in an organized repatriation--voluntary return, 
agreement between the host country and country of origin, and
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return to place of origin within home 1 and--are not easily met.
In three of the situations, pressures in the countries of asylum 
--Thailand, Honduras, and Sudan [for the Ugandans]--impelled the 
refugees to leave and made the returns less than fully voluntary. 
Indeed, the return of the Khmer refugees to the border was forced 
by Thailand and only good timing made the flight from Sudan back 
to Uganda relatively safe.
Agreement between the host and the country of origin is. 
only likely in the return from Malawi to Mozambique. Indeed, 4n 
several of the returns--to Cambodia, Tigray, and El Salvador--the 
refugees are going to areas not fully controlled by the central 
governments of their homelands. UNHCR prefers to operate within 
the framework of a tripartite agreement between itself and the 
host and home countries, but in an era of low-intensity 
conflicts, returns often take place in disputed regions. As a 
part of the United Nations system, UNHCR must deal through 
sovereign governments and is disadvantaged in the many situations 
involving liberation fronts and governments not seated in the UN. 
These so-called 1 non-recognized entities' play an important role 
in spontaneous repatriations. Insurgents may control large 
areas; some even maintain effective civil administrations in 
their areas. It can be relatively safe for refugees to return to 
homes in such zones, and given some assistance many might go 
home, especially if they perceive few other options for ending 
their refugee status.
Oddly, as is clear in the five sketches, return to the 
refugees' place of origin is more likely in those situations
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where governments and UNHCR are not involved. The proposed 
Mozambique return is specifically not to their original 
homesteads and the Cambodian return was to the border zones. In 
Tigray, El Salvador and Uganda the refugees were able to go back 
to their homes.
Failure to satisfy UNHCR's three preconditions for return 
is not necessarily a sign of a flawed return. In the fiv‘e 
returns outlined above, only Thailand's forced return of the 
Cambodians to the border zone appears not to be in the refugees 
best interests. Ironically this forced repatriation has the most 
governmental and international agency involvement. Although the 
other returns are less than ideal, they do achieve the 'most 
desirable' goal of getting the refugees back home.
THE NATURE OF CONTEMPORARY REFUGEE PROBLEMS
UNHCR's 1985 Note on International Protection indicates 
that 'the majority of today's refugees are persons who do not 
fall within the "classic" refugee definition in the UNHCR 
Statute.' Rather they are 'persons who have fled their home 
country due to armed conflicts, internal turmoil and situations 
involving gross and systematic violations of human rights.'
'Classic' refugees are caused by government action and 
there is a strong political element inherent in their situation. 
Refugees flee because of a controversy between themselves and 
their government. Because the basic bond between citizen and 
government has been broken, 'fear has taken the place of trust, 
and hatred the place of loyalty. Trifles do not cause
refugees, and refugees cannot easily pick up and go home until
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substantial changes occur or until there is a change in the 
regime that originally caused them to flee. A continuing 
controversy over politics, race or religion may meant that 
prospects for the refugees' return will remain poor for a 
considerable length of time.
But today, most refugees are externally displaced persons 
rather than 'classic' refugees. They are not necessarily^ fleeing 
a controversy that personally involves them. Often they are : 
getting out of harm's way rather than fleeing from persecution. 
Many who flee from a land suffering from a protracted, low- 
intensity conflict may be fleeing from a proximate cause rather 
than the conflict itself. Years of conflict lead to adjustments 
and experience that provide some degree of safety for individual 
civilians. The final push toward a mass exodus is not generally 
the direct result of the familiar conflict, but a last straw 
change in conditions such as a famine, drought or other natural 
calamity, or increased fighting that is too close for comfort. 
Such displaced persons may not fear their government, or whoever 
normally controls their region. They may well be unafraid and 
willing to return home to an insecure land if the proximate cause 
has eased even though the low-intensity conflict persists.
For example, the basic bond between citizen and government 
has apparently not been broken in the case of the refugees from 
Mozambique. They are fleeing the atrocities of RENAMO whose 
raids have prevented farming activities and caused famine in a 
fertile land. The Mozambican proposal^ to return the refugees 
from Malawi to areas of Mozambique other than their original
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homesteads thus is not contingent on a change of regimes or of 
fundamental conditions. The refugees may worry that the 
government cannot protect them adequately, but apparently they do 
not fear the government itself.
ORGANIZED AND SPONTANEOUS REPATRIATION 
Both organized and spontaneous repatriation are desirable 
methods of achieving a durable solution. However, there is a 
major difference in the effort and resources that are devoted.to 
the two methods, with almost all thought and effort being devoted 
to organized repatriation. Oddly, the results are strongly 
inversely related to the resources; the lion's share of refugees 
return by the spontaneous route.
Because it is a humanitarian, non-po1itica 1 agency UNHCR 
takes a mostly passive stance with regard to promoting 
repatriation. Organized repatriations with agreements between 
the parties normally must wait for a decisive event. UNHCR does 
not have power to resolve the root cause of a refugee exodus. It 
does not arrange peace conferences or negotiations, these are the 
responsibility of the Secretary-General and other political arms 
of the United Nations, or of bilateral efforts.
UNHCR relies heavily on tripartite agreements--country of 
origin, host country and UNHCR--as a method of promoting 
voluntary repatriation. However, this government-to-government 
approach with UNHCR in the middle is ponderous, time-consuming 
and produces meagre results. Without denying the occasional 
success, such as Djibouti in 1983,26 the overall record of 
tripartite commissions does not justify UNHCR's heavy reliance on
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host government and homeland government agreement as a 
precondition for repatriation. More typical of tripartite 
commissions is the Uganda-Rwanda-UNHCR commission from 1983 to 
1985. It met, talked, processed, detailed, screened and achieved 
little. When southern Uganda was liberated by Museveni's 
advancing forces, the commission temporized. Eventually 30,000 
refugees returned spontaneously from Rwanda in late 1985 '-with 
little international assistance. UNHCR's second precondition.for 
organized movements--'agreement between the host country and the 
country of origin on the modalities of the movement and the 
conditions for reception'--is often irrelevant in contemporary 
refugee situations involving displaced persons. The time-lag 
between the onset of improved conditions and the implementation 
of agreements can be frustrating to refugees.
The difference in scale between side-by-side spontaneous 
and organized repatriations can be striking. In many situations 
UNHCR arranges for the return of dozens or hundreds of refugees 
while tens of thousands return on their own initiative.
Spontaneous voluntary repatriation from the Sudan continued 
on a much larger scale than organized movements. While the 
repatriation of some 518 Ethiopians was organized in 1985 - 
almost twice as many as in 1984 - more than 55,000 
Tigrayans returned spontaneously ... During the same period 
of 1986 another 65,000 returned to Ethiopia in the same 
manner/'
This difference in scale of more than 100 to 1 between spontaneous 
and organized repatriations suggests that the refugees and UNHCR 
hold different standards of safety and perceptions of timing with 
regard to repatriation.
Voluntary repatriation is a troubling business. People are
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returning to a place where once they feared or suffered 
persecution. Not surprisingly, judging from the reactions of 
voluntary agencies active in the field, the greatest worries 
accompany organized voluntary repatriations when there has been 
no change of government in the homeland. Refugees fear that 
going home through official channels and being 'turned over' to 
their government would put them in danger or mark them as~ 
suspect. There is a danger that the country of origin will 
assume the returnees have supported an anti-government movement. 
Additionally, many organized returns are suspect as being at the 
convenience or pressure of the host government which is more than 
pleased to be rid of an unwanted burden and is less concerned 
about protection questions.
Spontaneous voluntary repatriation may occur in response to 
certain host pressures or displeasure about the refugees' 
continued presence but in its essentials it represents the 
refugees' judgement of their predicament and their best interests 
and gives the refugees some control over their own fate rather 
than relying on a tripartite commission or trusting their own 
government. It is well to note that spontaneous repatriation 
restores the refugee's sense of his own effectiveness and 
importance while organized repatriation excludes refugees from 
tripartite commissions and gives them little voice in the 
modalities and conditions of return.
Indeed, the powerlessness of the refugees when dealing with 
the international system is sometimes displayed when they choose 
to go home spontaneously. In 1985, when tens of thousands of
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Tigrayans decided to go home to Ethiopia, attempts were made to 
block their return. These obstacles were well-intentioned, 
motivated by a belief that the risks were too great. But this
raises a question about the international system's obligations to
/
refugees who want to return spontaneously against the advice of 
the system. The vastly greater numbers of refugees favoring 
spontaneous return indicate that refugees make their dec rs ions on 
criteria other than those of concern to the international 
community. It is the refugees who must evaluate the risks and. 
make the choice. From border camps they will often have better 
communications with home and can more effectively evaluate the 
safety of return. Once they have made the evaluation that the 
risk is tolerable, the international community has an obligation 
to assist the return. It is counter-productive and a denial of 
the 'right ... to return to his country '28 to provide aid if they 
will remain refugees but not give it if they want to go home.
ISSUES
Although everyone supports the idea of voluntary 
repatriation as the ideal and most desirable durable solution, 
there is little agreement on means of achieving or promoting it. 
Coles notes that voluntary repatriation 'has so far not been 
examined in any depth by experts or scholars. ... The absence of 
any adequate treatment of the general question of solution is a 
striking feature of the traditional approach to the refugee 
problem.'29
In attempting to promote new thinking about voluntary 
repatriation, the most fruitful avenue of exploration is likely
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to be spontaneous repatriation. These irregular returns raise 
major issues regarding the voluntary character of a repatriation, 
dealing with non-recognized entities, and matters of protection. 
Because these are issues that have been ignored rather than 
studied, what follows is more in the form of lines of inquiry 
than conclusions or recommendations.
Voluntary
Although many people think of voluntary repatriation as a 
purely 'voluntary' act reflecting the individual will of the 
refugee, in practice the decision to return is often externally 
initiated and brought about by outside persuasion, influence, and 
even pressure. Refugee status is not necessarily permanent, it 
is dependent on conditions in the homeland. The Cessation clause 
(Article I.C. (5)) provides that the Convention 'shall cease to 
apply' if the circumstances causing refugee status have ceased to 
exist and the refugee cannot refuse to avail himself of the 
protection of his country. But, as stated earlier, most of those 
called refugees are really displaced persons fleeing generalized 
conflict rather than individual persecution. Therefore they do 
not fit the Convention refugee definition, although they do 
satisfy the more generous terms of the OAU Convention on 
refugees. Once conflict subsides in the homeland, either 
temporarily or permanently, who--UNHCR, the host government, the 
refugees--dec ides that refugee status ought to cease?
Host countries have a definite interest in encouraging the 
return of refugees. However, non-po1itica 1 factors, such as poor 
economic conditions at home, may make refugees hesitant about
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return. The 1986 overthrow of the Duvalier regime in Haiti 
opened the door for the potential return of one million exiles. 
But only a handful have gone back. 'Unwilling to face the 
uncertainty of a country whose economy remains mired in poverty 
and despair, most prefer to hang on to whatever opportunities 
they may have found abroad.'^0
The 1978-1979 return of 200,000 refugees from Bangladesh to 
Burma had some elements of compulsion, yet it is usually referred 
to as one of UNHCR's successful operations.
At the outset of the repatriation there was evidence of 
marked opposition among the refugees to returning. ... On 
the day that the repatriation officially began, only 58 
refugees crossed the border. Two and half months later 
only 5,300 had returned. ... the number should have been 
50,000. The reluctance to return stemmed from fear of what 
might await the refugees.
By the end of 1979, however, some 187,000 had suddenly 
returned to Burma. The return movement seems to have been 
precipitated towards the end by conditions in the camps and 
by a curtailment of food rations21 designed to encourage an 
early decision in favour of r e t u r n . 2
There is clearly a gap between principle and practice that 
needs to be explored with regard to 'voluntary' repatriation.
The principle as expressed by the 1985 UNHCR Executive Committee 
is that repatriation 'should only take place at their [the 
refugees'] freely expressed wish; the voluntary and individual 
character ... and conditions of absolute safety, ... should 
always be respected.' Practice, however, is not to sit back and 
wait for the refugees to express a desire to go home. A somewhat 
less individual and less voluntary standard has been accepted and 
lauded. Evidence of pressure is commonplace particularly when no 
other durable solution, settlement or resettlement, is possible.
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Duress, with its implication of no free choice by the refugees, 
is clearly unacceptable, but it is not easy to determine the 
dividing line between acceptable and unacceptable pressure, 
encouragement, suggestion, persuasion, and inducement. Crisp 
writing about the 1983 return of Ethiopians to Djibouti notes:
Even if they still had doubts about returning, the refugees 
were aware that their future in Djibouti was at best a 
limited one. After four years of intermittent ~ 
intimidation, the refugees morale was low, and the 
advantages of attempting to remain in Djibouti were 
difficult to perceive. ... It seemed preferable to live in 
poverty and danger in their own country than to remain as 
unwelcome guests in foreign country.33
Non-Recognized Entities
There are levels of 1non-recognized entity' from a 
government in full but disputed control of its territory but 
denied international recognition (and its seat in the UN as in 
the case of Cambodia); to a guerrilla liberation movement on its 
way to victory and control, for example, Museveni controlling 
southern Uganda, then taking the capital, then controlling the 
north; to a guerrilla force in a long-term struggle that may have 
control of a varying 'liberated' area such as in Tigray or 
E r i t r e a .
The report of the 1985 meeting on Voluntary Repatriation at 
the International Institute of Humanitarian Law in San Remo which 
was reported to the Executive Committee's Subcommittee of the 
Whole on International Protection recommended 'the High 
Commissioner should not be unduly inhibited by the formal status 
of any particular entity. ... he should be prepared, wherever 
necessary, to deal with non-recognized entities.'34 This
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suggestion, however, was objected to in the Subcommittee's 
deliberations and was not included in the Executive Committee's 
Conclusions on International Protection.
The Executive Committee's reluctance to grant UNHCR 
authority to deal with non-recognized entities raises several 
questions about protection for those choosing repatriation. What 
protection can be offered to refugees returned to an area‘s held by 
a liberation movement or even a de facto government? What 
control or sanctions are available if a non-recognized entity - 
abuses refugees or recruits them for its military units. What 
protection if the other force captures the area?
It may well be politically impossible for an international 
organization such as UNHCR to deal with a non-recognized entity 
operating on the territory of a sovereign UN member state.
Imagine the Moroccan reaction to UNHCR negotiating with the 
Polisario Front35 to return people to Western Sahara. It may, 
however, be feasible for the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) to deal with non-recognized entities. Its governing 
instruments and mandate may be more flexible and relevant within 
a sovereign state structure than those of UNHCR. In addition, it 
is clearly possible for a host government to deal with a non- 
recognized entity, although whether or not it is desirable is 
another matter.
Return to heavily contested areas would probably be 
impossible. However, 1ow-intensity conflict has ebbs and flows 
and unevenly impacts a wide area. In some cases, as in Tigray, 
Eritrea, Western Sahara, Namibia, etc., the non-recognized entity
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is a refugee-based organization. Beside its political expression 
as a party, front, or movement, the refugee-based organization 
will have aid societies, education programs, and other welfare- 
based agencies that can play an important role for returnees as 
the TPLF and REST have been doing for the returnees to Tigray. 
Protection
In suggesting increased emphasis on spontaneous 
repatriation, the greatest problem is the issue of adequate 
protection of the refugees. In particular, in promoting 
spontaneous repatriation or in dealing with a non-recognized 
entity, what is the allowable level of risk? Certainly UNHCR 
must err on the side of caution and not risk the refugees lives. 
Moreover, does any other organization have the right to take 
greater risks? Spontaneous repatriation where the refugees have 
full knowledge of conditions and risks might be one way out of 
this di1emma. However, it is crucial that spontaneous 
repatriations be carefully examined for elements of coercion or 
danger. It is conceivable that spontaneous returnees could be 
relying on false or self-serving information, perhaps from a 
liberation movement wanting the return of its 'people', or be 
returning in haste without due consideration of the risks.
Overall, the guiding principle ought to be respect for the wishes 
of the refugees, but the responsibility to protect them cannot be 
thereby abdicated.
There are many other issues concerning voluntary 
repatriation, such as the impact of assistance and the triggers 
to return, which cannot be covered in this short chapter but
- 2 3 -
which urgently need further study.
CONCLUSION
Voluntary repatriation is the durable solution least 
effectively promoted by the international community. Many 
disputes are too political to allow any humanitarian agency, such 
as UNHCR, to play a significant role. Often parties use refugees 
politically to score points on a territorial or Cold War Viva! 
who can be criticized as a persecutor. Sometimes refugees are 
used in connection with guerrillas to prevent a rival from 
consolidating a victory as in Nicaragua, Kampuchea and 
Afgan i stan.
Voluntary repatriation has to be promoted in a charged 
political atmosphere of distrust and conflicting interests. 
Historically, voluntary repatriation is not easy to arrange, but 
it is possible.
While being a refugee should be a temporary state 
of affairs, there is a real danger of refugee situations and the 
problems of refugees becoming institutionalized and of people 
remaining refugees forever. The foremost challenge facipg the 
international community today is to reverse this trend. 0
A glimmer of hope in this situation is the fact that many 
refugees, against great odds, spontaneously repatriate.
Spontaneous repatriation is occuring on a large scale with little 
international understanding or assistance. It needs to be 
promoted, assisted and augmented without violating the 
fundamental principles of voluntary and safe return that are 
present in most organized returns. There is an opportunity here 
to assist many refugees to find their own durable solution.
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